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EXCHANGE CONSOLIDATION
AND MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES REGULATION
BO HARVEY*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, globalization and a growing demand for capital
have increased competition within the capital markets for the
business of issuers and investors.1 This has led stock and derivatives
exchanges to change their business models from mutual business
entities, run for the benefit of their members, to demutualized
corporations, run for the benefit of shareholders.2 Consequently, as
for-profit corporations, exchanges have looked to position themselves
more competitively in an internationalized securities market. Part of
such positioning has included increasing exchange alliances and
acquisitions on a global scale. This is highlighted by the recent
merger between the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
Euronext (the new entity to be known as NYSE-Euronext). With
financial markets now spilling across national borders, demutualized
exchanges see opportunities for growth and expansion by
consolidating internationally.
However, these changes have put securities regulators in the
position of trying to stay ahead of the curve, as exchanges—often
seen as once historic landmarks of national pride—push the limits on
cross-border consolidations. Traditionally, “[f]inancial exchanges
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* Bo Harvey is a J.D./M.B.A. candidate at Duke University School of Law and The
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1. See generally Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No.
34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,258 (Dec. 8, 2004); Irina Shirinyan, The Perspective of U.S.
Securities Disclosure and the Process of Globalization, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 515, 515-16
(2000).
2. For an in-depth explanation of the exchange demutualization process, see generally
Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?, 21 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 657 (2001).
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come with a lot of political, cultural, and emotional baggage.”3 Yet,
the current activity of exchanges is challenging traditional models of
securities regulation. This note highlights the role demutualized
exchanges are playing in the convergence of international securities
regulation and evaluates the extent to which exchange consolidation
fits within one traditional theoretical framework applied to
international securities regulation. In practice, cross-border exchange
consolidation is largely shaping the path regulators are taking with
respect to cross-border securities regulation. However, securities
regulation will always remain bound by national borders in certain
important respects.
Part I of this article will provide some background to exchange
demutualization and explain the driving factors behind an increased
competition among capital markets. Part II will introduce the
traditional theoretical models of international securities regulation. It
will focus on the idea of international “convergence” of regulatory
standards and set forth examples of convergence (or the lack thereof)
within, and between, the United States and the European Union.
Part III will analyze how exchanges have recently influenced
international regulatory coordination as illustrated by the merger
between NYSE and Euronext.
I. DEMUTUALIZATION AND
COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL MARKETS
A. Brief History of Exchange Demutualization
The first stock exchange demutualized in 1993.4 Prior to this,
exchanges were run as mutual businesses. Mutual businesses consist
of private members rather than shareholders and are run by managers
for the benefit of members, not for public profit.5 In demutualizing,
exchanges take on the form of a “public corporation—the most
efficient organizational form for large enterprises.”6 In doing so,
exchanges seek the benefits of responding to competition, basing

3. Flying in Formation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2007, at 76-77.
4. See Shamshad Akhtar, Demutualization of Asian Stock Exchanges- Critical Issues and
Challenges, in DEMUTUALIZATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES: PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS AND CASE
STUDIES 3, 5 (Shamshad Akhtar ed., 2002). The first exchange to demutualize was the
Stockholm Exchange. Id.
5. Bradley, supra note 2, at 661.
6. Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541,
2542 (2006).
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decision-making on shareholder value, pursuing new business
strategies, unlocking members’ equity values, and facilitating business
7
partnerships. Since 1993, over twenty-one stock exchanges have
demutualized.8 This trend is not limited to stock exchanges;
9
derivatives exchanges have also demutualized. By 2006, several
major exchanges worldwide had demutualized or changed their
business structure to allow for shareholders. These exchanges
include, among others, Euronext (itself the result of a consolidation
of five exchanges in England, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and
Portugal),10 NYSE, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of
Trade, London Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Deutsche
Boerse, Australian Stock Exchange, and Hong Kong Stock
Exchange.11
B. Factors Driving Exchange Demutualization and Competition
Exchange demutualization, among other things, facilitates
increasing competition within the “exchange business;” in other
words, the business of providing a market where issuers can raise
capital and investors can buy and sell securities. In response to recent
competition, alliances and consolidations have emerged as exchanges
12
Generally, the forces driving
look to increase profitability.
demutualization are also those driving exchange consolidation, and
fall into one of two broad categories: changes in the business and
financial landscape and changes in the regulatory environment.
7. Bradley, supra note 2, at 668-69 (listing the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s five major
objectives for its demutualization).
8. Akhtar, supra note 4, at 5.
9. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 668-69; Akhtar, supra note 4, at 6 (listing derivatives
markets that have formed alliances).
10. See Euronext, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/editorial-1994-EN.html (last
visited May 1, 2007).
11. Reena Aggarwal & Sandeep Dahiya, Demutualization and Public Offerings of
Financial Exchanges, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 96, 98 tbl.1 (Summer 2006), available at
http://faculty.msb.edu/aggarwal/183final.aggarwal.pdf.
12. See Flying in Formation, supra note 3; Robert Daniel, NYSE, TASE Meet with Eye To
More Dual Listings, MARKETWATCH, Jan. 20, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/
story/nyse-tel-aviv-exchange-tout/story.aspx?guid=%7BB8906DED%2DEB14%2D4620%2D9
72D%2D30C9C0DC72F4%7D; see generally David Weidner, NYSE Allies with Tokyo Stock
Exchange, MARKETWATCH, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/nyseforms-working-alliance-tokyo/story.aspx?guid=%7BCBDCBE78-B20A-4CED-A3AD-E3C279
77D302%7D (discussing the alliance between the NYSE and the Tokyo Stock exchange). For
an example of the intensity of the bidding war between exchanges, see Norma Cohen, Nasdaq in
Last-Gasp Move to Win Bid, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at 20 (discussing Nasdaq’s attempt to
purchase a controlling stake in the London Stock Exchange).
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These categories are not meant to be airtight independent causes;
factors in one category may correlate with factors in another as, for
example, regulatory changes produce changes in the financial
landscape and vice versa.
1. Changes in the Business Environment that Affect Exchanges.
First, exchanges are reacting to the increasing technological
capabilities of alternative trading systems (ATSs), also known as
electronic communication networks (ECNs), which have put pressure
on the traditional role of exchanges as an order-matching
intermediary. ECNs can match orders transparently, efficiently, and
13
anonymously, and offer lower transaction costs for investors. ECNs
have also lowered barriers of entry into the exchange business, as a
14
physical trading floor becomes unnecessary. Thus, there has been
downward pressure on profit margins resulting from order-matching,
and exchanges are looking to diversify into other lines of business,
such as clearing and settlement.15 Adding to this pressure has been an
increase in the amount of order-flow large that brokerage houses are
crossing internally (particular for institutional clients trading large
blocks of shares), which obviates the need for sending orders to an
exchange.16 Moreover, these technological innovations facilitate the
trading of securities regardless of where the issuer is listed.17 “Today’s
technology enables market participants to tap simultaneous and
multiple sources of liquidity from remote locations,” so investors can
obtain real-time information about securities trading on foreign
18
exchanges, and execute orders on those markets electronically.
13. See Akhtar, supra note 4, at 5-6; see also John G. Moon, The Dangerous Territoriality of
American Securities Law: A Proposal for an Integrated Global Securities Market, 21 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 131, 156-62 (2000) (detailing the specific trading advantages that ECNs have
compared to physical trading floors).
14. Akhtar, supra note 4, at 7.
15. Battle of the Bourses, ECONOMIST, May 27, 2006, at 65-67.
16. Id.; Larry Tabb, Tabb Group, NYSE / Euronext: The Age of Global Exchange
Consolidation Begins (2006), http://www.tabbgroup.com/thought/NYSE_EuroNext.pdf. For
example, POSIT, Liquidnet, and Pipeline are few computerize order-crossing systems that allow
anonymous execution of large blocks of shares, which many institutional investors consider
desirable. See Nina Mehta, Internal Crossing, TRADERS MAG., June 2006; UBS Taps Dark
Pools, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2007.
17. See Moon, supra note 13, at 153-55.
18. Roberta Karmel, Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure Standards Change SEC
Regulation of Foreign Issuers?, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 485, 519 (2000). See also E-Trade to
Handle Foreign Stocks, LATIMES.COM, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fiwrap20.1feb20,1,7505449.story?coll=la-headlines-business&ctrac (describing possibility of
online trading of foreign equities).
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Collapsing national and technological barriers have thus had the
effect on stock exchanges that these lowered barriers would have on
any other industry, increasing global competition for the listings of
securities issuers and for the trading activity of investors buying and
selling those securities.
Second, the boom in financial innovation and derivatives trading
19
has caused exchanges to look for ways to enter these markets. Able
to offer investors access to a wide array of financial products,20
exchanges can differentiate themselves in a competitive environment.
NYSE-Euronext, for example, expects derivatives to be the biggest
source of new revenue for the combined entity.21 Euronext traded
forty percent of Europe’s $16 trillion in outstanding (notional)
22
derivatives contracts, and represents a significant addition to the
NYSE’s traditional strength in providing a liquid market for stocks.
Third, in recent years the U.S. financial markets have not
experienced the same increased growth in market value as certain
23
foreign markets. In conjunction with a declining dollar over the last
few years, this relatively slower growth than other international
markets has prompted U.S. exchanges to expand into betterperforming and increasingly active international markets, either by
24
forming alliances or through mergers.
2. Changes in the Regulatory Environment. Recent regulatory
changes have also increased competition among stock and derivatives
exchanges. Two important regulations passed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) that are widely seen as enabling
stronger competition are the Regulation of Exchanges and
25
Alternative Trading Systems (Regulation ATS), and the recently

19. See Richard Beales, Equity Derivatives Tipped for Dramatic Growth, FT.COM, Apr. 10,
2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ecd19150-e790-11db-8098-000b5df10621.html.
20. See Richard Beales, Exchanges Try to Offer Instruments that Align with OTC Credit
Derivatives, FT.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0d95433e-d8a8-11db-a759000b5df10621.html (reporting on new exchange-traded instruments).
21. Aaron Luccheti and Peter A. McKay, NYSE Cranks up Derivatives Machine, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 2006, at C1.
22. Telis Demos, What’s Driving the Stock Exchange Merger Binge?, FORTUNE, June 12,
2006, at 32.
23. See, e.g., Tony Tassell, Europe Tops US in Stock Market Value, FT.COM, Apr. 2, 2007,
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=%22Europe+tops+US+in+Stock+market+value%22&
aje=true&id=070402010807.
24. See Battle of the Bourses, supra note 15, at 65-67.
25. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998).
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amended, controversial Regulation National Market System
26
Regulation ATS was adopted in 1998 in
(Regulation NMS).
response to the growing number of ECNs, which were not
“exchanges” in the traditional sense but were systems that “otherwise
perform[ed] with respect to securities the functions commonly
performed by a stock exchange.”27 The purpose of Regulation ATS
was “to more effectively integrate the growing number of alternative
trading systems into the national market system, accommodate the
registration of proprietary alternative trading systems as exchanges,
and provide an opportunity for registered exchanges to better
28
compete with alternative trading systems.”
Regulation ATS
lowered entry barriers by allowing ECNs to compete directly with
registered exchanges for the matching of orders.29
Regulation NMS was adopted in 1975, in order to connect the
various stock markets so that orders could be routed on a national
scale.30 One express purpose of Regulation NMS is to allow for
exchange competition. Regulation NMS, recently amended in 2005,
is “premised on promoting fair competition among individual
markets, while at the same time ensuring all of these markets are
linked together.” It sets forth the objective of promoting “vigorous
competition” among both individual markets and individual orders.31
Together these regulations provide strong incentives for exchanges to
reorganize as corporations, in order to partner or consolidate with
emerging, demutualized competitors.
The changing regulatory regime in Europe has also fostered
competition and consolidation among exchanges in attempting to
create an integrated pan-European capital market. The European
Commission has explicitly stated that “any remaining capital market
fragmentation should be eliminated, thereby reducing the cost of
capital raised on E.U. markets.”32 The Markets in Financial

26. Regulation National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg.
37,496 (June 29, 2005).
27. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70,847 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)-(a)(1) (2005)).
28. Id. at 70,844.
29. See Fleckner, supra note 6, at 2566.
30. Id. at 2554.
31. Regulation National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg.
at 37,498.
32. Roberta Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 15 (1999).
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Instruments Directive (MiFID),33 seen as trying to stimulate
34
competition, rests on the notion that “market participants and
investors [are] able to compare the prices that trading venues . . . are
required to publish. To this end, it is recommended that Member
States remove any obstacles which may prevent the consolidation at a
European level of the relevant information and its publication.”35
With these obstacles removed, several E.U. exchanges, such as
Euronext, have consolidated, creating a liquid, efficient,
interconnected financial infrastructure that has attracted issuers and
investors, and challenged the traditional dominance of the U.S.
capital markets. More closely interlinked European financial markets
have provided a viable alternative for international issuers as a source
of capital.
Moreover, the recent gap between standards in the United States
and European regulatory environments, combined with the crossborder, mobile nature of capital, have had a secondary (and perhaps
unintentional) effect of intensifying the consolidation trend among
exchanges. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002,36
in response to a wave of corporate accounting scandals, enhanced
accounting and disclosure requirements of publicly traded companies.
Several commentators have suggested that the burdens of SOX
compliance may have caused a decline of foreign issuers choosing to
raise capital in the United States.37
For example, a report
commissioned by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and
Senator Charles Schumer notes that E.U. capital market revenues are
growing by twenty percent per year, compared with seven percent in

33. Council Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
34. Tabb, supra note 16.
35. Council Directive 2004/39/EC, supra note 33, at 4.
36. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
37. Robert G. DeLaMater, Speech, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers:
How the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s
Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 114-16 (2006); Hong Zhu & Ken Small,
Has Sarbanes-Oxley Led to a Chilling in the U.S. Cross-Listing Market?, CPA J., Mar. 2007,
available at http://www.nysscpa.org/printversions/cpaj/2007/307/p32.htm.
See also Jenny
Anderson, New York Leaders Warn of Wall Street Decline, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 22, 2007,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/22/business/wall.php (reporting on a McKinsey
study commissioned by Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York and Senator Charles Schumer
of New York, addressing a “burdensome legal and regulatory environment” as one reason,
among others, that the U.S. global financial services market could decline in light of European
and Asian competition).
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the United States.38 Also, the U.S. share of global initial public
offerings (IPOs) has fallen from fifty-seven percent in 2001 to sixteen
percent in 2006 while E.U. IPOs have increased from thirty-three
percent to sixty-three percent during the same period.39 Some of this
decline can be attributed to a period of deflation in the U.S. stock
market value since 2000. Yet, even controlling for this period of
market value deflation, many foreign companies are choosing not to
list in the United States, and are in fact de-listing from U.S. exchanges
at an increasing rate relative to U.S.-based companies.40 These events
have led some in Congress to re-evaluate the global competitiveness
41
of U.S. capital markets. While the idea that foreign companies are
prevented from listing on U.S. exchanges because of a strict U.S.
regulatory regime is not new.42 SOX may have hastened American
exchanges’ search for overseas markets as a way to diversify away
43
In essence, for-profit
from a single regulatory environment.
exchanges are responding as corporations are intent on maximizing
shareholder value by seeking to establish diverse sources of revenue
and footholds in markets with growth opportunities. Thus, the tighter
standards of SOX may have been one factor contributing to the
global exchange consolidation trend.

38. MCKINSEY & CO. AND NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV. CORP., SUSTAINING NEW
YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP, at 41, 44 (Jan. 23, 2007),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Zhu & Small, supra note 37, at 32. Zhu and Small’s study focuses on the 2002-2005
period.
41. See DeLaMater, supra note 37, at 118; China’s Strategy and Objectives in Global
Capital Markets: Hearing Before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Comm., 109th
Cong. 19-27 (2005) (testimony of Robert G. DeLaMater). For example, several of the biggest
IPOs in the last few years have been listed in Hong Kong or Shanghai. See MCKINSEY & CO.
AND NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV. CORP., supra note 38.
42. See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms
Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S58 passim (1994) (arguing for easing access to U.S.
capital markets for foreign issuers so as to maintain the “international stature of our financial
markets.”).
43. See generally Demos, supra note 22, at 14 (positing that U.S. exchanges are searching
overseas for new sources of revenue); MCKINSEY & CO. AND NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV.
CORP., supra note 38.
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II. MODELS OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
A. Background
Mobile capital and porous borders between national financial
markets have highlighted the disparities between different regulatory
models, enlivening an ongoing spirited debate that reevaluates the
territorial conception of securities law.44 The traditional territorialbased approach to securities law is being challenged by the
45
For example, U.S. securities law has a
globalization of finance.
history of wrestling with the issue of determining the outer
boundaries of its extra-territorial reach, as seen, for instance, in the
exemptions the SEC carves out to accommodate foreign issuers, such
as the attempt to restrict the territorial scope of registration
requirements through the passage of Regulation S.46 Regulation S47
provides safe harbors for issuers in response to the question of
whether it is appropriate to require an issuer to register its securities
under the Securities Act of 1933—even though there would be
jurisdiction to do so—when it offers those securities exclusively to
non-U.S. citizens in offshore transactions.48 Regulation S “declared
the SEC’s explicit embrace of a territorial approach to Securities Act
49
registration.” Like Regulation S, the reach of anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193450 implicates a territoriallyfocused inquiry, as reflected in the “conduct” and “effects” tests that
the courts have developed to determine—sometimes not without
difficulty—the proper subject-matter jurisdiction in securities fraud
cases.51 With these territorially-focused inquiries firmly established,52

44. Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice
in International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1367 (2002).
45. Id. at 1369-71.
46. Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global
Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 955 (1994).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.901 (2006).
48. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 242-43 (rev. 5th ed.
2006).
49. Tung, supra note 44, at 1375.
50. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
51. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-08 (2d Cir. 1968), rev’d in part en
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). But see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 988-89
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (limiting the scope of effects that can be
successfully invoked); see also HAZEN, supra note 48, at 730-31 (describing the conduct and
effects tests); James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules for International Securities Transactions?, 66

03__HARVEY.DOC

160

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2008 1:28:26 PM

[Vol 18:151

unless regulators clarify and coordinate their oversight of securities
markets, determining the outer boundaries of national securities law
will only become more difficult as financial exchanges begin to
operate through cross-border mergers and alliances.
Due to the conflict between territorially-based law and
borderless capital flows, various theoretical alternatives have been
proposed to accommodate the decreasing importance of national
borders in capital markets. As a general matter, alternatives to
conventional territorially-based regulation fall somewhere along a
spectrum of models of international securities regulation, with the
concept of harmonization at one end, and regulatory competition at
the other.53 Some commentators have set forth finer, more detailed
descriptions of the various possible approaches to international
securities regulation,54 but for the purposes of this article, identifying
the two conceptual poles in this debate, harmonization and
competition, is sufficient.
As will be discussed, convergence
(sometimes called “equivalence”) is a third approach that falls
somewhere between the two extremes of harmonization and
regulatory competition.55
1. Harmonization. Harmonization is defined as the idea that
56
there should be a single, uniform, international regulatory standard.
Benefits of such a standard would be reduced transaction and
administrative costs for issuers and investors, and thereby increased
efficiency and liquidity.57 Reducing duplicative and even conflicting
regulatory standards would lower the cost of capital, benefiting both
U. CIN. L. REV. 1179, 1181-82 (1998) (stating that “the reach of the U.S. securities laws is
territorial” and specifically that the conduct of the parties more frequently establishes
territoriality).
52. See Cox, supra note 51, at 1181.
53. See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation, 27 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 255, 255-56 (2007).
54. See generally Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 526-38; Hal S. Scott, An Overview of
International Finance: Law and Regulation (Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Scott, International
Finance] (unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=800627).
55. Arguably convergence may be an apple in a bucket of oranges. It is possible to argue
that convergence is not easily comparable to harmonization and competition because it is, to a
greater degree than the models of harmonization and competition, descriptive and grounded in
the practicalities of the financial and regulatory environments; whereas the concepts of
harmonization and competition are more prescriptive in nature.
56. Hal S. Scott, The Future Content of U.S. Securities Laws: Internationalization of
Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 78 (2000).
57. Wei, supra note 53, at 255-56.
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investors and issuers. Regulators themselves would also benefit by
being able to allocate their investigative and auditing resources more
efficiently.
Moreover, some argue for harmonization because
“competitive regulation inevitably means more regulation,”58 as
different jurisdictional standards lead to regulators from each
jurisdiction jostling to exert authority over particular transactions or
parties. A national example of a harmonized system would be the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom, which
replaced eighteen other U.K. regulators when it was formed under
the Financial Services Act.59 The FSA acts as a “super-regulator,”
overseeing the securities, commodities, insurance, and banking
60
industries. At least one prominent scholar has noted that a unified
regulatory arrangement is a “sound idea.”61
However, there are several potential drawbacks to
harmonization. First, although it might promote efficiency, it does
not guarantee that the most optimal regulatory standards will be
implemented.62 Like a monopoly, a single regulator can be efficient
but suboptimal. Moreover, it may stifle regulatory innovation.63
Having several competing regimes can provide a useful signaling
device to regulators, as companies choose to issue securities where
regulation is neither overly burdensome nor so light that investors
require a higher return on their investments to compensate them for
additional risk.64 This signaling function is entirely absent when
issuers and investors have no choice but to adhere to a single set of
standards. Lastly, there are practical problems associated with
actually implementing a harmonized regulatory system.
A
completely harmonized system would require that states cede power,
to some extent, to an international body.65 This is likely to be
politically unacceptable, as “each nation would have to forswear its

58. Jerry W. Markham, Comparative Analysis of Consolidated and Functional Regulation:
Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 414 (2003) (arguing for
competitive regulation within the American domestic setting).
59. See Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 8, (Eng.); Financial Services and Markets Act,
2000, c. 8, § 2 (Eng.).
60. Markham, supra note 58, at 520.
61. Id. at 410.
62. Scott, supra note 56, at 78.
63. Id. at 80.
64. Wei, supra note 53, at 256.
65. Scott, supra note 54, at 16.
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customary territorial jurisdictional activity.”66 This is unlikely, given
the strong policy interests in maintaining at least some sovereign
control over national securities regulation.
2. Competition. Regulatory competition is the idea that
different regulatory standards should be encouraged as countries
67
tailor laws to their specific circumstances. At its most extreme, this
view—also known as issuer-choice—advocates that securities issuers
68
This is
should be allowed to choose their regulatory regimes.
beneficial because, by giving participants in the financial markets the
ability to choose among these standards, regulators would be subject
to the discipline of the marketplace, resulting in a “race to the top.”
The “best” regime—in terms of balancing costs with risks—would
succeed.69 Contrary to initial impressions, advocates of this model
argue that the competition would protect investors and provide a
superior regulatory regime, just as competitive markets for products
protect consumers from product exploitation.70 Issuers of securities
that choose regulatory regimes that are overly lax would, in theory,
be at a disadvantage in the marketplace, as investors would require a
higher return on their securities, increasing these issuers’ cost of
capital.71 Moreover, by choosing a regulatory regime with a higher
standard of disclosure, issuers signal to investors the quality of their
financial information. Arguably, this is one reason why the United
States has generally enjoyed a preeminent role as a place to raise
capital, notwithstanding its complicated regulatory structure. On an
intra-national level, the United States is an example of a competitive
model, where different regulators exert separate, and to some extent
competing, oversight of the commodities, securities, banking, and
insurance industries.72 While intra-national competition within the
United States does not reflect the ability of an issuer to freely choose

66. Tung, supra note 44, at 1368.
67. Wei, supra note 53, at 256.
68. See Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation,
2 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 387, 388-89 (2001) (discussing why issuers should be given a choice
in disclosure levels).
69. See Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 535-36.
70. Romano, supra note 68, at 389, 393.
71. For a detailed study of the correlation between the quality of the regulatory regime and
the cost of equity, see generally Venkat R. Eleswarapu & Kumar Venkataraman, The Impact of
Legal and Political Institutions on Equity Trading Costs: A Cross-Country Analysis, 3 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1081 (2006).
72. Markham, supra note 58, at 320-74.
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their national regulatory environment, it does provide a theoretical
contrast to certain European countries, such as the United Kingdom,
that have a unified regulatory scheme.
A criticism of the competitive model is that, insofar as
competitive regulation leads to competing or overlapping standards,
73
it increases costs to investors and issuers. In an age of financial
conglomerates, this means a firm may be subject to oversight by
several regulators, a number that only increases as the firm enters
new national markets. The recent decision by the NYSE and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to combine their
regulatory functions was, at least in part, a response to member firms’
asserting that the overlapping jurisdiction of the two exchanges gave
74
rise to inconsistencies and inefficiencies. Moreover, there is the
question of whether competition will indeed lead to a “race to the
top” rather than a “race to the bottom.”75 Insofar as investors do not
have perfect information, they may be unable to appropriately price
76
differences among regulatory regimes. Interestingly, the argument
for full regulatory competition, like the argument for full
harmonization, runs into practical difficulties with national
sovereignty by requiring regulators to cede the decision of applicable
law to the issuers of securities.77 The concept of competition also runs
into the paradox that if it works as expected—the most “successful”
regime attracting the activity of issuers and investors—it will in any
event lead to some degree of convergence because unsuccessful
regimes will seek to imitate successful ones in order to promote

73. See Scott, supra note 56, at 88-90.
74. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, NASD, NYSE Say They Will Merge Their Regulatory Bodies,
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, at D03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801696.html. Mary L. Schapiro, former NASD
chairman and chief executive, and current CEO of the merged body, known as the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), acknowledged as much by stating “duplicative and
inconsistent regulation and overlapping jurisdiction will become a thing of the past.” Id.
75. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 537.
76. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1200, 1233-34 (1999); Scott, supra note 54, at 21. Moreover, there is the interesting notion of
regulatory arbitrage and exploiting this model when information asymmetries exist. Do these
disparities introduce possibility of regulatory arbitrage, or firms gaming the system in order to
capture regulator cost savings? For discussion of this possibility in a domestic setting, among
the competing regulators in the United States, see generally Frank Partnoy, Financial
Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211 (1997).
77. For example, for an exposition of how issuer-choice will simply not work due to a lack
of “supply” rather than “demand,” because monopolistic regulators will not be willing to
“supply” the market with competing regulatory choices, see Tung, supra note 44, at 1368.
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capital formation.78 Thus, an environment of truly competitive
regulation in fact creates some conditions that would also induce at
lease some degree of convergence of regulatory standards, although it
is unclear precisely how similar these standards would be.
3. Convergence. Convergence lies between the two theoretical
poles of harmonization and competition. Convergence does not
imply securities laws should be identical, but neither does it mean
there should be no coordination between various regulators in their
79
Convergence is sometimes referred to as
lawmaking efforts.
80
“equivalence,” and is generally used in the sense that regulatory
standards are roughly close enough to be functionally substitutable,
such that the policy objectives of each nation are adequately
fulfilled.81 One commentator has noted there may be fine distinctions
between the ideas of “convergence” and “equivalence.” 82 However
for the purposes of this article, “equivalence” and “convergence” are
83
used interchangeably.
Because of the lack of political feasibility associated with
implementing a purely harmonized or competitive model, one benefit
of convergence is its eminent practicability. It is highly unlikely that a
regime of regulatory competition or harmonization would occur on
an international scale. This is because it requires agencies to cede
sovereignty and public policy decisions to issuers or an international

78. A country’s capital base and its ability to attract capital play critical roles in the
macroeconomic definition of per-capita income. Thus, there is a strong incentive for countries
to provide an environment conducive to capital formation.
79. See Wei, supra note 53, at 256 (using the term “equivalence” rather than
“convergence”).
80. Charles McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Market and Services, Remarks at
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n Roundtable: On the Road Towards Convergence
and Equivalence – State of Play in International Accounting (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript available
at http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2007/070306cmcSECR.htm).
81. Wei, supra note 53, at 257-58.
82. Id. at 256-59. In addition, some regulators may have competing understandings of the
terms “equivalence” and “convergence,” however, these differences in understanding seem to
be more the result of jurisdictional tensions between regulators in their attempts to define an
appropriate measure of accommodation to foreign standards, and thus they do not want to
appear to use a term that might only ambiguously convey the amount of accommodation they
would agree to. See id. at 260-61 (explaining the different understandings E.U. and U.S.
regulators may have of these terms).
83. For detailed treatment of the finer degrees of different approaches, see Scott, supra
note 54, at 15; Wei, supra note 53, at 260-62; Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 526-38.
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body.84 To the extent that sovereignty still matters in a world where
capital fluidly crosses national borders, convergence is powerful, as it
recognizes that there are national policy interests in retaining an
element of territorially-based securities law, while accommodating
the needs of international capital markets. Arguably, capital markets
and regulators are in fact working toward some form of convergence.
The goals of securities regulators are universal, yet the proposed best
methods of achieving these goals differ from nation to nation. For
example, the twin aims of the SEC, protecting investors and
promoting efficient capital formation,85 are also the aims of securities
86
Yet, because of “differences in economic
regulators worldwide.
development, culture, legal and social environments, and the fact that
different legal markets and their corresponding regimes develop at
different rates of speed and over different periods of time . . .
domestic rules will have to exist which will not be supplanted by the
convergence process.”87 Thus, in contrast to harmonization and
competition, convergence is better suited to balance the local with the
global by considering the benefits of an international regulatory
regime while accommodating important differences of economies,
cultures, and legal environments.
B. Examples of Convergence
1. European Union Common Market. The European Union is
a helpful case study because it has had to address many of the specific
issues related to convergence in its attempt to create an integrated
capital market, and thus is “a model, an experimental laboratory, as
to how regulation might be formulated and implemented in the

84. See Scott, supra note 54, at 16 (stating common rules require states subject to such rules
to cede authority); Tung, supra note 44, at 1368 (claiming issuer choice is “politically
implausible.”).
85. See generally Consideration of Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital
Formation, Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006). See also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS SEC. REG. 210 (4th ed. 2004).
86. International Organization of Securities Commissions, Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation, at i (2003), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf
(“[T]hree objectives of securities regulation . . . are: the protection of investors; [e]nsuring
markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; [and t]he reduction of systematic risk.”). The
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is an international body
comprised of securities regulators plus affiliate members that are stock exchanges, international
organizations, and other similar entities. See generally IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/.
87. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 516-17, 539.
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international system at large.”88 Steps toward convergence worldwide
have succeeded largely due to the efforts of E.U. regulators
promoting convergence as an approach to dismantling legal barriers
to integrated financial markets.89 European regulators have explicitly
acknowledged the reduced cost of capital that is realized under
converged standards, pointing to studies that indicate a benefit of
approximately one percent of gross domestic product in the
90
European Union alone.
The Treaty of Rome was implemented to remove restrictions on
the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital within the
91
European Union. The E.U. initially attempted to fully harmonize its
financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s, but noted it would require
92
300 pieces of legislation to be enacted on an E.U.-wide basis. Thus,
it shifted toward a policy that combined “home market regulation”
with mutual-recognition; this meant member states agreed to certain
minimum standards while tolerating non-essential differences,
ultimately leaving the regulation of issuers to the “home market”
(where the issuer was incorporated) rather than the “host market”
(where the issuer was listed).93 This policy was predicated on the
host-country’s recognition of the home-country’s rules as controlling
the operations of cross-border transactions, and was facilitated by the
reciprocity of mutual-recognition granted between nations.94 Such a
policy required a degree of convergence, in that the home and host
countries’ standards had to be roughly equivalent in order for each to
feel its policies were being served in the other’s markets.
The European Union initially designed a timetable for the
targeted adoption of these securities laws standards which was
implemented through the Single European Act amendments to the

88. Scott, supra note 54, at 8.
89. Wei, supra note 53, at 258.
90. Hearing before H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of
Alexander Schaub, Director-General, DG Internal Market of the European Commission),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/general/2004-05-13-testimony_en.pdf.
91. Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957, 2006
O.J. (C 321) 1.
92. Scott, supra note 54, at 15. See generally Completing the Internal Market: White Paper
from the Commission to the European Council, COM (1985) 310 final (June 14, 1985), available
at http://aei.pitt.edu/1113/01/internal_market_wp_COM_85_310.pdf (outlining the steps
necessary for achieving an integrated internal market for a European Community).
93. Scott, supra note 54, at 27.
94. Id. at 27-28.
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Treaty of Rome.95
These amendments encourage the use of
96
Directives to achieve a common market. Directives originate with
the European Commission (E.C.) and are not self-executing.97 The
Directives are binding on E.U. member states as each member state
has a duty to implement the aims of the Directive; however,
Directives allow member states to choose the appropriate method of
achieving the Directive’s final objectives. 98 In the European Union’s
attempt to establish a functioning common market, the E.C. has
generally favored the use of Directives to achieve harmonization of
laws.99 The “implementation of these Directives is coordinated
through E.U.-wide functional regulators” composed of individuals
from member states, “such as the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR).”100
These Directives are largely responsible for the increased
convergence of capital markets in Europe. Moreover, through the
process of integrating fifteen different national securities regimes,
E.U. regulators have developed a model of converged standards
while leaving enforcement of territorially-based issues to national
regulators. It is beneficial to look at three Directives promulgated to
unify capital markets within Europe: the Transparency Directive, the
Prospectus Directive and the Fifth Directive on Company Law.
a. Transparency Directive.
The Transparency Directive101
established requirements concerning the periodic disclosure of
102
A significant
information, including the annual financial report.
change made by the Directive, as it was amended in 2004, was the
adoption of the requirement that issuers across the European Union
complete reports, using the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) by 2005.103
This was significant because it
95. Karmel, supra note 32, at 12. For a detailed treatment of the background of the Single
European Act and its basis in the, see also P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 33-35, 132-34 (3d. ed. 1998).
96. Karmel, supra note 32, at 13.
97. Roberta S. Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 379, 383 (2005).
98. See, e.g., K.P.E. LASOK AND D. LASOK, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 142 (7th ed. 2001).
99. KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 95, at 779.
100. Scott, supra note 54, at 8.
101. Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC); Council Regulation 1606/2002,
The Application of International Accounting Standards, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC).
102. Karmel, supra note 94, at 394-95.
103. Council Regulation 1606/2002, supra note 101, at 2.
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introduced the issue of whether non-E.U. issuers—particularly U.S.
issuers that reported in U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
104
Principles (U.S. GAAP)—would also be required to report in IFRS.
Initially member states were given the option of allowing U.S. issuers
105
to defer adoption of IFRS until 2007, but this has been changed
recently to 2009.106 This amendment allows standard setters and
regulators in each country to continue engaging in dialogue and
107
working through the convergence process until that time.
b. Prospectus Directive. Another important Directive that has
facilitated capital market integration has been the Prospectus
108
The Prospectus Directive establishes a set of uniform
Directive.
requirements throughout the European Union concerning the
comprehensive disclosure of information upon an issuer’s securities
offering.109 It was intended to play a central role in integrating the
market for financial services in the European Union.110 Under the
Directive, the regulators in the home state for each issuer process the
issuer’s disclosure documents, and, once approved, securities
regulators in other E.U. member states cannot impose additional
111
Interestingly, the Prospectus Directive
disclosure requirements.
does not provide for civil liability, unlike the Securities Act of 1933;
these matters are left to the host states.112 This is an important issue
from an enforcement and remedy standpoint, and is one this note will
return to later.
c. Proposal for a Fifth Directive on Company Law. A Directive
that was intended to facilitate convergence, but was highly
104. Karmel, supra note 97, at 394-95.
105. Stuart H. Deming, International Accounting Standards, 40 INT’L LAW. 363, 364 (2006).
106. McCreevy, supra note 80.
107. Comm. of Eur. Sec. Reg., Technical Report, CESR’s advice to the EC on the Work
Programmes of the Canadian, Japanese, and US Standard Setters, the Definition of Equivalence
and a List of Third Country GAAPs Currently Used on the E.U. Capital Markets, sec. II.8 (Mar.
8, 2007), available at
http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=groups&mac=0&id=46
[hereinafter Technical Report].
108. Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 354) 64 (EC).
109. Karmel, supra note 97, at 388.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 392. See also Council Directive 2003/71, supra note 108, at 65 (identifying the
home member state as “the one best placed to regulate the issuer for the purposes of this
Directive”); id. at 70 (defining “home member state” and “host member state”); id. at 78
(describing relationship between host and home member states in light of prospectus being
approved by the home member state).
112. Karmel, supra note 97, at 392-93, 398; Scott, supra note 56, at 82.
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controversial, was the Proposal for a Fifth Directive.113 This Directive
revealed sharp differences between E.U. member states, particularly
the United Kingdom and Germany, over certain aspects of corporate
law, and is thus instructive as to those areas of law where convergence
may be difficult to achieve. The Fifth Directive, also known as the
Company Structure Directive,114 was amended and re-proposed three
times yet was never adopted.115 All of the Proposals for a Fifth
Directive concerned corporate organizational structure, employee
participation, rights and duties of the board, and shareholders’
rights.116 The Fifth Directive provoked disagreement in part because
it touched upon fundamental differences concerning the significant
role of shareholders’ equity capital in the United Kingdom, in
contrast “to the role of bank credit or government . . . funding on the
117
The Directive also highlighted significant differences
Continent.”
between E.U. member states concerning the structure of the board, in
particular the differences between one- and two-tier boards.118 In fact
119
the first proposed Directive mandated a two-tier board. However,
this revealed sharp differences between the U.K. model, which
generally favors a one-tier board that can be amended through the
articles, and the German model, which mandates a two-tier board
separating the functions of supervision and management.120 The
German model gives stakeholders other than shareholders—the main
group being employees—the possibility of influencing the company
through the supervisory board.121 Moreover, the Directive highlighted
that the influence of shareholders wield through a shareholders’
meeting is quite different from country to country. In the United
Kingdom and France, the shareholders’ meeting is seen as “the
supreme organ” for shareholders, especially if it appoints managers
directly; by contrast, in Germany the shareholders’ meeting is seen
“at most as being on an equal footing” with the exercise of the powers
of other constituencies, such as employees and directors, and is

113. Amended Proposal for Fifth Directive, 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2 (EC).
114. See STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: ORGANIZATION, FINANCE
AND CAPITAL MARKETS 219 (2007).
115. See id. at 62, 65 fig.4a, 66, 219.
116. Id. at 62, 219.
117. Karmel, supra note 32, at 18.
118. See GRUNDMANN, supra note 114, at 219.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 225.
121. See id. at 225-31.
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restrictive in regard to the actual powers that can be exercised at the
122
meeting.
The Transparency and Prospectus Directives have facilitated
common standards within the European Union; however, they were
supported by a common political infrastructure, which is lacking on
an international scale between the E.U. and other countries.
Regardless, the content of these Directives provides insight into what
123
areas of law may see more convergence than others. For instance,
the Proposed Fifth Directive sparked significant controversy because
it prescribed rules governing significant cultural and economic biases
reflected in features such as the basic structure of corporate
governance (one- versus two-tier boards), the administrative rights of
shareholders (such as powers exercised at the shareholders’ meeting),
and the role of stakeholders such as employees; accordingly, it is
unlikely that these areas—more broadly, areas affecting internal
company structure and governance—will be subject to a globally
converged set of standards.124 Additionally, as the Prospectus
Directive leaves civil liability determination to host states, it is likely
that questions of liability and appropriate remedies may be left to
each individual nation to determine. By contrast, questions of
disclosure and accounting standards are more easily resolved via
converged standards, because they do not touch upon culturally and
politically sensitive corporate governance relationships between
management, directors, shareholders, and auditors, and the relative
rights and duties of each group.
It is also notable that E.U. member states do not apply securities
laws to their own investors extra-territorially, as does the United
125
States. This fundamental difference between the European Union
and United States may mean that convergence on an international

122. Id. at 241.
123. See discussion infra Part III.
124. In some ways a European fear of America “exporting” SOX also reflects these core
disagreements, because it was seen as an attempt to mandate an American style of corporate
governance, in contrast to the very different relationships between auditors, shareholders,
management, and directors that exist in Europe and elsewhere in the world. For example, prior
to the passage of SOX, the E.U. sent Senator Sarbanes a letter urging for accommodations for
foreign accounting firms. Congress Acts: A Tough Corporate-Reform Bill Sails Through,
ECONOMIST, July 27, 2002, at 62. For an explanation of the differences between corporate
governance law in Germany and the United States, see Jonathan Shirley, International Law and
the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 511-13
(2004).
125. Scott, supra note 56, at 83.
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scale would need to overcome the significant history of extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. The following section
sketches out the relatively recent history of convergence as it has
played out between the European Union and United States, focusing
particularly on the possible convergence of accounting standards.
2. Trans-Atlantic Convergence. There has been a long history
of cooperation between securities regulators in the United States and
elsewhere. For example, the SEC has entered into a number of
bilateral Memoranda of Understanding in the areas of insider trading
126
and enforcement. The SEC also has a long history of balancing the
protection of investors with the facilitation of efficient capital
markets.127 Aiding the formation of efficient capital markets and
allowing U.S. investors to access the securities of foreign companies
encourages the accommodation of foreign issuers, so that they list on
U.S. exchanges and are subject to the SEC disclosure system, while
not being so accommodating that U.S. issuers (or investors) are at a
disadvantage.128 Historically, the SEC has walked this line by carving
out specific exemptions for foreign issuers. For example, Regulation
S was intended to provide a clear safe harbor from registration for
foreign private issuers.129 It operated “as a safety valve, relieving the
SEC of pressure exerted by foreign issuers . . . U.S. investment banks
130
131
[and others].” Likewise, one of the goals of Rule 144A, governing
the private placement of securities, was to increase foreign investment
in the U.S. economy.132 Recently, the SEC has tried to accommodate
foreign issuers with respect to SOX, as the Commission recognizes
the importance of keeping the United States attractive to those
wishing to raise capital, and the European Union was concerned with
133
The SEC has also entered into
the foreign impact of SOX.
regulatory dialogue with the European Union, including supporting
meetings with the Commission of European Securities Regulators, a

126. Scott, supra note 54, at 11.
127. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006).
128. Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate
Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 862-63 (2004).
129. See Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902-230.904 (2006).
130. Karmel, supra note 32, at 512.
131. Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
132. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 521.
133. Scott, supra note 54, at 12.
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technical regulator, on several issues that may result in greater
134
convergence of regulator standards between the two.
One area of particular and recent interest has been the possibility
of convergence in U.S. GAAP and IFRS accounting standards.
National accounting standards are a cornerstone of a country’s
financial system, providing an essential means of disclosing critical
135
information for the valuation and comparison of companies. Thus,
streamlining accounting standards is an essential first step before
considering a more general convergence of securities laws. Some
degree of convergence in accounting standards has taken on renewed
importance now that the European Union operates under the single
standard of the IFRS. For instance, IFRS is increasingly being used
outside the European Union: Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and the Philippines have all adopted IFRS.136 Canada and
China have announced they will be moving their standards toward
137
IFRS in coming years. Meanwhile, U.S. issuers still use a separate
standard, U.S. GAAP.
U.S. GAAP standards are set by a private body, the Financial
138
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). IFRS grew out of an effort
by another private body, the International Accounting Standards
139
These two private bodies have worked together
Board (IASB).
since 2002, when they signed the Norwalk Agreement, in which they
committed to the development of high-quality compatible accounting
standards that could be used in cross-border financial reporting.140
These were private efforts, given the IASB and FASB’s status as

134. Id. For a list of SEC’s dialogues and international efforts, see Securities and Exchange
Commission, International Organizations, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_intlorg.htm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
135. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 550; see also Hal S. Scott, Nomura Professor and Dir. of
Program on Int’l Fin. Sys., Harvard Law Sch., Remarks at International Financial Reporting
Standards Roadmap Roundtable 3 (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/ifrsroadmap/ifrsroadmap-transcript.txt) (“Accounting standards may be arcane to
some, but they are the bedrock of the financial system, and, ultimately, of the economy as a
whole.”).
136. Deming, supra note 105, at 365.
137. Id. at 366. See also Cultural Revolution, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2007, at 63-64 (describing
the significance of China’s move to IFRS).
138. See FASB, Facts About FASB 1, available at http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts_about_
fasb.pdf.
139. Deming, supra note 105, at 363.
140. Fin’l Accounting Standards Bd. & Int’l Accounting Standards Bd., Memorandum of
Understanding (The Norwalk Agreement) (Sept. 18, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/
news/memorandum.pdf.
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private bodies. The U.S. government became involved after the
passage of SOX, when Congress mandated that the SEC examine the
possibility of changing the nature of the U.S. accounting system from
a “rules-based” approach (which describes the U.S. GAAP approach)
to a “principles-based” approach (which describes the IFRS
approach).141 Further, in 2005, the chief accountant of the SEC
published an article that laid out a “roadmap to elimination of the
SEC’s requirement that foreign private issuers reconcile financial
statements prepared under IFRSs to U.S. GAAP.”142
It
acknowledged the increasing use of IFRS, stating the “[p]rimary
driver behind the expanded use of IFRSs is a decision made by the
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union that
all listed European Union companies . . . must prepare their
consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRSs from 2005
onward.”143 The article and its roadmap were formally endorsed by
the SEC just a few months after its publication.144
On the European side, the European Union, in both the
Transparency and Prospectus Directives required that the European
Commission establish whether non-E.U. accounting standards,
including U.S. GAAP, were equivalent to IFRS.145 As part of this
process, the European Commission directed the Commission of
European Securities Regulators (CESR) to determine whether these
standards are equivalent and to advise whether non-E.U. issuers
should continue to be allowed to use their respective accounting
principles, instead of IFRS. The study recommended, first, that
issuers be allowed to use U.S., Canadian, and Japanese GAAP until
2009. In 2009, the CESR’s decision determining equivalence is set to
be announced, after which use of non-E.U. accounting standards will
be allowed only if they are determined to be equivalent to IFRS.146
These efforts are laudable. A determination that U.S. GAAP
and IFRS were equivalent would be a significant step toward
convergence. Additionally, there have been some steps toward

141. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comm., Remarks at
International Financial Reporting Standards Roadmap Roundtable (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030607cc.htm).
142. Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 661, 662 (2005).
143. Id. at 661-62.
144. See Cox, supra note 141.
145. See Technical Report, supra note 107, sec. II.8.
146. Id. sec. II.9.
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international convergence with respect to disclosure standards where
there are few national differences and rules are generally consistent
147
The European Prospectus Directive, for example,
with U.S. law.
adopts disclosure requirements that are generally the same as those in
148
However, full harmonization on all aspects of
the United States.
securities law is both unlikely and undesirable. For instance, the
trans-Atlantic dialogue over accounting standards, as well as the
European Union’s experience creating an integrated regulatory
scheme, highlights particular areas where convergence is relatively
easier to achieve, as opposed to areas such as enforcement.
“Standardized enforcement would require countries to have similar
enforcement remedies, both administrative and private. . . . [A]
significant number of foreign issuers have reportedly avoided U.S.
public markets because of the stiff enforcement remedies employed
by the SEC—including potential criminal liability—and the prospect
of costly private class action suits. . . .”149 For example, the Prospectus
Directive does not provide for civil liability, and illustrates how
enforcement and remedies available to investors will likely remain
territorially-based. Indeed, even in the highly unified European
Union, responsibility for enforcement is left up to host country
regulators.150
Moreover, there are significant differences in the type of
investors in the European Union versus in the United States.
In the U.S., 50% of investors are retail, whereas in Europe, the
number of retail investors is quite small. Further, securities in
Europe are overwhelmingly debt instruments, in contrast to the
equity instruments being the dominant security in the U.S.
Consequently, investor protection means different things to
151
Americans and Europeans.

Likewise, as seen from SOX and the Fifth Company Directive, any
attempt to harmonize laws related to corporate governance will face
stiff resistance because it implicates culturally and socially informed
norms about the corporate power relationships between shareholders,
managers, owners, and auditors. These differences reveal that for

147. Scott, supra note 56, at 78-79.
148. Scott, supra note 54, at 17.
149. Scott, supra note 56, at 78-79.
150. Karmel, supra note 97, at 392; Scott, supra note 56, at 82; see discussion supra Part
II.B.1.b.
151. Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, Sec. and Exc. Comm., Speech at the U.S.-Europe
Symposium Program on International Financial Systems: Convergence and Beyond (Nov. 13,
2003).
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particular public policy interests, regulators have an incentive to
remain territorially-focused in their approach, so as to protect those
distinctive financial market characteristics or political aims that are
not shared by other nations. There are limits to convergence, and by
acknowledging these limits regulators are able to focus their efforts
more productively on those areas where coordinated, roughly
equivalent, and high-quality standard-setting is more likely.
III. RESPONSES TO
CONVERGENCE AND THE ROLE OF EXCHANGES
A. Regulatory Responses to Convergence
Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have been engaged in a
dialogue for some years concerning the possibility of convergence,
and accommodations on both sides have been made. Yet, these
efforts have taken on renewed significance with the increased
consolidation among demutualized exchanges such as the recent
merger between the NYSE and Euronext. This merger brings
together one of the world’s oldest, largest, and most respected
exchanges, the NYSE, with the most transnational exchange,
Euronext, which operates exchanges in five different European
countries.152
Despite a trend toward convergence, the idea of shared
standards is not always viewed positively; it can be characterized as
overly accommodating to foreign regulatory standards. For example,
Annette Nazareth, SEC Director of Division of Market Regulation,
testified before Congress concerning a proposed directive in the
European Union:
[The SEC] is concerned about the possible imposition of standards
on U.S. firms by the European Community in the form of
‘equivalence’ determinations. . . . To the extent that ‘equivalence’ is
really a means of having a ‘coordinator’ in the E.U. evaluate the
quality of our regulatory regime, we do not think that approach will
153
be productive or add to investor protection.

152. See Euronext, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/editorial-1994-EN.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2008); Euronext, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/editorial-1612-EN.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
153. Annette L. Nazareth, Dir., Div. of Market Regulation, Sec. and Exch. Comm.,
Testimony Concerning Pending Proposals by the European Commission (May 22, 2002),
available at www.sec.gov/news/testimony/052202tsaln.htm.
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Her comment highlights the interest regulators have in maintaining
sovereign control and preventing domestic standards from being
154
subjected to the evaluative authority of a foreign agency. Given this
interest, it is in some measure inevitable that E.U. and U.S. regulators
base their decision-making on domestic rather than international
factors.155 Regulators quite naturally appear unwilling to cede their
delegated authority without strong policy reasons, which is a reason
neither full harmonization nor complete competition are likely.
Disagreements in regulatory approaches can arise for a number of
reasons, since “nations are no different than commentators in
disagreeing widely as to just what policy consideration is to be
served . . . [and] how best to fulfill a policy objective.”156 Further,
when considering multi-jurisdictional securities transactions that
implicate conflicting regulatory demands, there arises the
fundamental issue of whether such transactions should be governed
by public or private law.157 When evaluating the prospect of
convergence, this issue is likely to remain a principal consideration
that can introduce a basic, and perhaps even irreconcilable, tension
between different regulatory approaches. This tension comes sharply
into focus as the capital markets continue to pull international
securities law in the direction of convergence.
B. Exchange Activity Pushes Regulators Toward Convergence
The merger between NYSE and Euronext will not dramatically
change the current, territorially-focused regulatory environment. As
noted in the SEC’s approval of NYSE rule changes associated with
the merger, “[a] core aspect of the structure of the Combination is
local regulation of the marketplace, members, and issuers. Therefore,
securities exchanges, members, and issuers of NYSE Group and
Euronext will continue to be regulated in the same manner as they
are currently regulated.”158 The SEC and the College of Euronext
Regulators (regulators from each of the five countries in which
Euronext operates an exchange) signed a Memorandum of

154. See discussion supra Part II.A.
155. See Karmel, supra note 97, at 379.
156. Cox, supra note 51, at 1180-81.
157. Id. at 1181.
158. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order
Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1 Regarding the Proposed Combination
Between NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V., Exchange Act Release No. 34-55293, 72 Fed.
Reg. 35,8033, 35,8035 (Feb. 22, 2007).
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Understanding on January 25, 2007, in which they affirmed the
159
Yet the
importance of keeping the markets locally regulated.
increased cooperation via this regulatory Memorandum is directly
connected to the NYSE’s and Euronext’s merger. Significantly, a
large part of the Memorandum was committed to ongoing
cooperation and dialogue.160 Each regulator stated that, to the extent
practicable, it would keep the other informed of regulatory changes
or material events that would have an impact on NYSE-Euronext,
including enforcement actions that could adversely impact the
exchange or any other market in another regulator’s jurisdiction.161
While Memoranda of Understanding between regulators concerning
162
exchanges, in their new roles as
enforcement are not new,
demutualized organizations, are necessitating even closer regulatory
dialogue beyond solely enforcement.
The NYSE-Euronext
Memorandum extends to keeping each other informed of regulatory
changes or material events. Such increased communication will
facilitate incremental movements toward convergence in other areas
such as accounting and disclosure requirements.
Presently, the activity in capital markets and among regulators
seems to be a validation of Professor John Coffee’s argument that
exchanges play a role in creating convergence because they create a
163
For
“bonding mechanism” when an issuer lists on an exchange.
example, foreign issuers enter into listing agreements with the NYSE
before listing their stock. By entering into this agreement, a foreign
issuer agrees to be bound by those regulatory standards that it may
not be subject to under its home jurisdiction.164 Listing on an
exchange represents a voluntary agreement by foreign issuers to be
subjected to a host country’s corporate and securities laws, and these
“bonding” agreements between exchanges and issuers are a
significant factor in creating converged standards.165 One argument

159. Memorandum of Understanding, Sec. Exch. Comm. and College of Euronext
Regulators, arts. 2, 13 (Jan. 25, 2007).
160. Id. arts. 2, 6.
161. Id. arts. 3, 16.
162. LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 5241 (3d. ed. 2005).
163. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 674, 691-92 (1999).
164. Id. at 691.
165. See id. at 652-53.
Professor Coffee also distinguishes between “functional
convergence” and “formal convergence,” and appears to categorize the “bonding mechanism”
of exchange listings as a type of functional convergence. See id. at 650, 679-82. For analyses of
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against this possibility is that self-regulatory organizations (SROs),
while standard-setters, are not able to pre-empt the laws of the
166
overseeing government regulatory body, such as the SEC.
However, the SEC and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions have a history of respecting the self-regulatory role that
exchanges play in the capital markets.167 The SEC has previously
stated that “[e]nhancing an SRO’s ability to implement and to
respond quickly to changes in the marketplace should encourage
innovation and better services. . . . Investors should also benefit from
a competitive environment in which SROs may easily adapt their
168
trading rules to respond to market opportunities.” There has been
a long history favoring self-regulation in the U.S. markets. The SEC
has acknowledged that, in creating the self-regulatory structure of
American securities markets, “Congress determined that the
securities industry self-regulatory system would provide a workable
balance between federal and industry regulation.”169 Moreover,
exchanges themselves are an interest group. Now that they are
operating as demutualized entities with shareholders, they will be
facing pressure from new constituencies to sustain and increase their
170
Thus, exchanges have an arguably greater interest
profitability.
now that they are demutualized in pushing for the convergence of
regulatory standards. As both interest groups and standard-setters,
exchanges are increasingly influencing the regulatory landscape going
forward, albeit on an incremental and indirect level.
CONCLUSION
The international landscape of securities law has been
undergoing significant changes for several years, as capital markets

specific corporate governance dynamics that might incentivize a company to list on a foreign
exchange, see id. at 680-83.
166. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 529.
167. See SRO Consultative Comm., Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Model for Effective
Regulation 1, 4 (May 2000), available at http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/2000-effective_selfregulation.pdf (“In an environment characterized by a variety of different markets and different
types of participants, a specialized and thorough knowledge is very beneficial.”).
168. Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43860,
66 Fed. Reg. 8,912 (proposed Feb. 5, 2001).
169. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-507000,
69 Fed. Reg. 71,256 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004) (citing S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
H.R. Doc. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)).
170. For a view of the NYSE as acting as an “interest group pressuring the SEC to relax its
disclosure standards,” see Karmel, supra note 32, at 487.
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become increasingly interconnected and global. This movement
appears to have accelerated recently with the development of
demutualized exchanges, leading to international consolidations and
alliances among exchanges. Going forward, the possibility of
international convergence of securities regulations, will largely evolve
based on how exchanges, as businesses, navigate the regulatory
waters surrounding cross-border combinations, and how, as selfregulatory organizations, they promulgate standards for issuers and
investors. Regulatory dialogue and approval is necessary and helpful,
yet the current activities of the exchanges themselves are strong
catalysts in the convergence of particular standards, such as those
governing accounting and disclosure.

